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PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC REGULATION:  A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BRITISH AND 
AMERICAN TAKEOVER CONTROLS 
BRIAN E. ROSENZWEIG* 
“There is no financial system in the world which does not depend to 
a large extent on the moral standards and disciplines of self-
regulation.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The hostile takeover is a powerful tool of corporate governance.2  
A hostile tender offer enables the shareholders of a target 
corporation to effect a change of control against the will of the 
incumbent board of directors.3  The ability of the tender offer to alter 
the management of a corporation in such a drastic fashion led both 
the United Kingdom4 and the United States to institute controls over 
hostile takeover transactions.  Despite clear similarities between their 
business5 and legal structures,6 the United Kingdom and the United 
 
Copyright © 2007 by Brian E. Rosenzweig. 
 * Brian E. Rosenzweig is a J.D. candidate at Duke University School of Law and serves 
as the Symposium Editor for the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law.  He 
graduated from Cornell University with a B.A. in 2005.  He would like to acknowledge 
Professor Deborah A. DeMott for her thoughtful comments and advice throughout the writing 
process. 
 1. Sir Nicholas Goodison, quoted in THE PANEL ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS, 
REPORT ON THE YEAR ENDED 31ST MARCH, 1987, at 3 (1987). 
 2. John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and 
Why?-The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1733 
(2007). 
 3. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 646-47 (2d ed. 2003). 
 4. The United Kingdom, England, Britain, Great Britain and all derivations thereof are 
used synonymously.  Any differences among the application of the City Code or other takeover 
regulations in the several parts of Great Britain are beyond the scope of this note. 
 5. See Geoffrey Miller, Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points of 
Contrast Between the United States and England, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51, 51 (1998).  The 
corporate cultures of both England and the United States feature unitary corporate board 
structures, disfavor employee codetermination, and place great emphasis on financing through 
public securities markets.  These characteristics distinguish the English and American 
economies from those of other large developed nations, such as Germany that favors a two-
tiered board structure, supports codetermination, and relies on banks for guaranteed financing, 
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States have pursued strikingly different models of corporate takeover 
regulation.  In England, takeovers are regulated by the City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers (City Code or Code), which is interpreted 
and enforced by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (Takeover 
Panel or Panel), a self-regulatory body appointed by bodies 
representing different segments of the British financial community.7  
In the United States, an overlapping system of state and federal laws 
and regulations controls bids for corporate control.8 
This Note illustrates the differences and similarities between 
England’s self-regulatory, standards-based system and America’s 
more formal, rules-based system.  Particularly, this Note will focus on 
the structural and procedural attributes of these systems, the “mode” 
of regulation,9 as opposed to the substantive rules that govern 
takeovers.  Part I describes the procedures and structures employed 
by the Takeover Panel to amend, interpret and enforce the City 
Code.  Part II illustrates the system of overlapping state and federal 
authority in the United States.  Part III contrasts the two systems and 
examines the prospect of convergence. 
I.  TAKEOVER REGULATION IN ENGLAND 
A. Origins of the City Code on Mergers and Takeovers 
In the early postwar era, the City of London (City)10 was faced 
with a simple choice about controlling the burgeoning takeover 
 
and Japan where keiretsu control corporations through extensive cross holdings of stock and 
maintain guaranteed financing relationships with banks.  Id. 
 6. In the field of business law, similarities between English and American law are so 
common that the term “Anglo-American” is often used by scholars in comparative analyses of 
business law provisions.  See, e.g., Robert Weber, Can the Sauvegarde Reform Save French 
Bankruptcy Law?: A Comparative Look at Chapter 11 and French Bankruptcy Law From an 
Agency Cost Perspective, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 257, 283-84 n.115 (2006) (comparing the contract 
options available under the “Anglo-American” and French models with regard to bankruptcy 
proceedings); Cally Jordan, The Conundrum of Corporate Governance, 30 Brook. J. Int’l L. 983, 
1002 (2005) (referring to the “Anglo-American securities industry”). 
 7. LAURENCE RABINOWITZ, WEINBERG AND BLANK ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS § 
4-1002 (5th ed. 2005). The Takeover Panel is now backed by the Financial Services Authority.  
This development will be discussed in Part I-B below. 
 8. CHRISTIN M. FORSTINGER, TAKEOVER LAW IN THE EU AND THE USA: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 74-75 (European Monographs No. 41, 2002). 
 9. In their recent article, Professors Armour and Skeel use the term “mode” to refer to 
the procedural and structural elements of regulatory regimes.  Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 
1729. 
 10. The City of London refers to the close-knit community of financial institutions 
traditionally based in the area of London known by the same name.  Id. at 1730. 
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market:11 either submit to legal regulation by the government or 
adopt a system of self-regulation.12  At that time, underutilization of 
assets and mismanagement made many British firms ripe targets for 
takeovers.13  In the absence of specialized legislation, common law 
courts were left to settle disputes over the defensive measures taken 
by incumbent boards.14  Due to concerns over timeliness and 
uncertainty, however, investors were not satisfied with the 
dependence on litigation.15  The City Code 16 was first drafted in 1968 
by a working party of City institutions as a solution to the perceived 
threat from hostile corporate bidders.17  The Code was comprised of 
ten General Principles and thirty-five rules.18  The Takeover Panel, a 
non-governmental body composed of representatives from British 
financial, industry and investor trade associations,19 is responsible for 
regulating takeovers through the administration of the Code.20 
In its earliest form, the Code lacked statutory authority and the 
only means of sanction available to the Takeover Panel was the 
public censure of violators.21  In order to compel compliance with the 
Code, the Panel implored the investment banks that advised parties 
in takeover transactions to honor its rulings by holding the banks 
responsible for their clients’ violations.22  The threat of losing the 
professional services and capital of the City investment banks 
compelled bidders and target boards to follow the Code.23 
 
 11. See Alan Hughes, The Impact of Merger: A Survey of Empirical Evidence for the UK, in 
MERGERS AND MERGER POLICY 30, 37 (James Fairburn & John Kay eds., 1989) (indicating 
that merger activity increased significantly in the late 1950s and again in the late 1970s). 
 12. RABINOWITZ, supra note 7, § 4-1002. 
 13. James J. Fishman, Enforcement of Securities Laws Violations in the United Kingdom, 9 
INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 131, 196 (1991).  The Code was actually the second attempt at self-
regulation by the City.  In 1959, a working group organized by the Bank of England 
promulgated Notes on Amalgamation of British Businesses, a set of rules designed to instill 
fairness in the takeover market.  These rules did not provide an adequate solution to the 
problem.  Id. 
 14. See Andrew Johnston, Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on 
the City Code, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 422, 436 (2007). 
 15. Id. 
 16. THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS (8th ed. 2006) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/new/ [hereinafter CODE]. 
 17. Fishman, supra note 13. 
 18. See Johnston, supra note 14, at 442. 
 19. CODE, supra note 16, § A(4)(a)(iv). 
 20. Id. § A(1). 
 21. See Johnston, supra note 14, at 444. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Fishman, supra note 13, at 196-97. 
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B. The Structure and Activities of the Takeover Panel 
The Code sets out the organizational structure of the Takeover 
Panel and its subcommittees.24  The makeup of the Panel 
demonstrates its business-oriented, self-regulatory nature.  Members 
of the Panel are appointed by various bodies such as insurers, 
investment companies, private and institutional investment 
management firms, banks, industry, accounting firms, investment 
banking houses and pension funds.25  The Executive, which carries out 
the ground-level supervision of takeovers independent of the Panel, 26 
is comprised of “employees and secondees from law firms, 
accountancy firms, corporate brokers, investment banks and other 
organsations.”27  Leading the Executive is the Director General, 
usually an investment banker who is concurrently an officer of the 
Panel.28 
Each member of the Panel is assigned to one of two committees.  
The Code Committee is the rule-making arm of the Panel, 
responsible for proposing and reviewing amendments to the Code.29  
The Hearings Committee, on which the Chairman and Deputy 
Chairman sit, is responsible for reviewing the decisions of the 
Executive.30  Assisting the Hearings Committee in this function is a 
Secretary, often a partner at law firm.31  Appeals of the decisions of 
the Hearing Committee are heard by the Takeover Appeal Board 
(formerly known as the Appeal Committee), an independent body, 
usually led by former judges with experience in takeover law.32 
1. Amending the Code.  Rule-making and amendment 
responsibilities are delegated to the Code Committee.33  Once the 
Code Committee decides to pursue an amendment to a certain 
provision, it releases a Public Consultation Paper (PCP), detailing the 
extent of the proposed amendment and soliciting views of interested 
 
 24. CODE, supra note 16, § A(4). 
 25. Id. § A(4)(a)(iv). 
 26. Id. § A(5). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. § A(4)(b). 
 30. Id. § A(4)(c). 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. § A(8)(a). 
 33. See id. § A(4)(b). 
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parties.34  After reviewing the position papers submitted by interested 
industry actors in response to the PCP, the Code Committee releases 
a final version of the amendment in the form of a Response 
Statement.35  The Code Committee may amend the Code without 
going through the formal consultation process when the proposed 
amendment “does not materially alter the effect of the provision in 
question or is a consequence of changes to relevant legislation or 
regulatory requirements.”36 
2. Enforcing the Code.  Traditionally, the Takeover Panel has 
relied in large part on community pressure to enforce its rulings.37  In 
spite of the original absence of direct statutory authority, the Panel 
was successful in compelling compliance with its rulings.  In 1987, 
Robert Alexander, Chairman of the Panel, explained in his personal 
statement to the Panel’s Annual Report one reason why non-
statutory regulation has been successful under the Code: 
It is sometimes said that the Panel lacks adequate power of 
sanction.  In fact, the decisions of the Panel are in practice complied 
with.  Almost all of those with whom the Panel deals are concerned 
to comply, and to be seen to comply with the Code.  This reflects in 
very great part the grave damage to the reputation of individuals, 
advisers and companies which would result from a breach of the 
Code or a failure to accept our decisions.38 
Alexander’s statement illustrates that maintaining a strong reputation 
for honesty and fair dealing is important to success in the City 
business community.  When the Panel determines that there has been 
a violation of the Code, it may issue a public statement of censure 
alerting the financial community to the misconduct.39  Censure has 
particularly strong force because of the close-knit nature of the City 
financial community.40 
Over time, the Government has also become more involved in 
enforcing the Code.  As the European Union has moved toward 
convergence in takeover control, there has been increased pressure 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See supra notes 21-23. 
 38. THE PANEL ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS, REPORT ON THE YEAR ENDED 31ST 
MARCH, 1987, at 5-6 (1987). 
 39. CODE, supra note 16, § A(11)(b)(ii). 
 40. See Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1771-72. 
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on Member States to become involved in takeover regulation.41  
England’s first response to the rising tide of EU takeover control was 
the endorsement procedure.  Under the Financial Services and 
Markets Act (FSMA) of 2000,42 the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) can endorse the Code, permitting the FSA to take action 
against parties or advisors who violate provisions or principles of the 
Code.43  In April 2001, at the request of the Takeover Panel,44 the FSA 
issued Consultation Paper 87, proposing the formal endorsement of 
the Code.45  The endorsement was modified and adopted in a Policy 
Statement issued in October 2001.46  Endorsement of the Code by the 
FSA had two significant effects. 
First, the endorsement enabled the Takeover Panel to request 
that the FSA enforce the Code.  Following a process termed “co-
operation” by the FSA,47 the Panel could refer a matter to the FSA 
after it determined that a party has committed a violation of the 
Code. 48  The FSA could then exercise its statutory mandate to compel 
compliance.  These procedures enhanced the reliability of Code 
enforcement because it gave the Panel an additional means of 
compelling compliance beyond the “soft pressure” formally relied 
upon. 
Second, the endorsement institutionalized the practice of “cold 
shouldering.”49  In general, “cold shouldering” is the adoption of a 
 
 41. See THE TAKEOVER PANEL, REPORT AND ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 
MARCH 2006, at 7 (2006). 
 42. FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT, 2000, c. 8, § 143 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts2000/00008—k.htm#143 [hereinafter FSMA 2000]. 
 43. See RABINOWITZ, supra note 7, § 4-1030 n.1; see also FSMA 2000, supra note 42. 
 44. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CONSULTATION PAPER 87: ENDORSEMENT OF THE CITY CODE ON 
TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS AND THE RULES GOVERNING SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITIONS OF 
SHARES § 2.7 (2001), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp87.pdf [hereinafter CONSULTATION 
PAPER]. The endorsement embodied in Consultation Paper 87 largely replicates the 
endorsement of the Code that existed under the Financial Services Act 1986, which was 
repealed upon passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.  See id. § 1.2. 
 45. Id.  
 46. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., POLICY STATEMENT: ENDORSEMENT OF THE CITY CODE ON 
TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS AND THE RULES GOVERNING SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITIONS OF 
SHARES, FEEDBACK ON CP87 AND MADE TEXT (2001), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ 
ps87.pdf [hereinafter POLICY STATEMENT]. 
 47. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 44, § 1.3. 
 48. CODE, supra note 16, § A(11)(b)(iv).  See also THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND 
MERGERS, REPORT ON THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 2001, at 10 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 
REPORT] ( “[T]he principal effect of endorsement is that if a firm fails to comply with the Code, 
the Panel can request the FSA to take enforcement action against that firm.”). 
 49. See POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 46, at 21. 
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rule by an organization that prohibits its members (or those entities it 
regulates in the case of government body) from dealing with parties 
that have violated the rules of a different regulatory body.50  Section 
4.3 of the FSA Handbook codifies cold shouldering: 
A firm must not act, or continue to act, for any person in 
connection with a transaction to which the Takeover Code 
applies . . . if the firm has reasonable grounds for believing that the 
person in question, or his principal, is not complying or is not likely 
to comply with the Takeover Code.51 
Cold-shouldering clearly lends additional weight to the Panel’s 
decisions and statements. 
In 2006, the legal relationship between the FSA and the 
Takeover Panel was modified to achieve compliance with the 
European Takeover Directive.52  The Companies Act designates the 
Takeover Panel as the entity authorized to promulgate and enforce 
takeover rules for the British market.53  This designation gives the 
Panel statutory authority to impose sanctions, a power previously 
unavailable to the Panel. 54  The new statutory regime replaces the 
endorsement arrangement that existed under FSMA 2000,55 but 
retains the statutory cold shoulder mechanism.56  The persistence of 
the statutory cold shoulder mechanism indicates that the FSA will 
continue to sanction regulated parties that engage in business or 
transactions with parties against whom the Panel has issued an 
adverse decision. 
However, the new arrangement enables the FSA to take action 
in certain circumstances without the request of the Panel, such as in 
cases of market abuse.57  While the FSA indicates that its routine 
practice will be to defer to the Panel with regard to sanctions and 
enforcement and that it will not take action until the Panel concludes 
 
 50. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 44, § 1.5. 
 51. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FSA HANDBOOK, MARKET CONDUCT (MAR) § 4.3.2, available at 
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/MAR/4/3 (last visited Dec. 20, 2007) [hereinafter 
MAR]. 
 52. Johnston, supra note 14, at 446. 
 53. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 943(1) (Eng.). 
 54. See id. § 952; see also Johnston, supra note 14, at 447 n.112. 
 55. Section 4 of the FSA Handbook’s MAR  indicates that the Endorsement of the Code, § 
4.2, ceased to be in force as of May 2, 2007.  MAR, supra note 51, § 4, available at 
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/MAR/4 (last visited Dec. 20, 2007). 
 56. See id. § 4.3.1, available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/MAR/4/3. 
 57. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FSA HANDBOOK, DECISION PROCEDURES AND PENALTIES 
MANUAL (DEPP) § 6.2.26, available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/DEPP/6/2 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2007) [hereinafter DEPP]. 
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its inquiry,58 the ability of the FSA to take unilateral action is a 
departure from the original operation of the Panel as a purely self-
regulatory body. 
These amendments clarify the ability of the FSA to both enforce 
the Code and to support the Panel in enforcing the Code.  While the 
FSA has indicated that its working relationship with the Panel is 
unmodified by the statutory realignment,59 there is a subtle difference 
from the endorsement procedure.  Under the old mechanism, the 
FSA could not act absent a request from the Takeover Panel, whereas 
under the current scheme, the FSA has the authority to enforce 
without a request from the Panel.  This subtle shift will not 
dramatically affect the independence of the Panel if the FSA chooses 
not to act unilaterally, but the arrangement may encourage the FSA 
to become increasingly involved in takeover regulation in the future. 
3. Interpreting the Code.  The Executive is responsible for 
interpreting the Code.60  The Executive may “give rulings on points of 
interpretation, application or effect of the Code which are based on 
the particular facts of a case.”61  Further, as the Executive 
recommends that concerned parties address the Panel with questions 
of interpretation early in the bid process so as to avoid any later 
disputes,62 the Panel is routinely able to review takeover proposals 
prior to their introduction.63 
The Executive permits parties to seek ex ante clarifications of the 
Code on a “no names” basis, meaning that such a request need not 
identify the parties involved in the proposed transaction.64  However, 
such interpretations are non-binding and do not immunize a party 
that acts in conformity therewith during any later Panel proceedings.65  
These rulings are confidential, can be rendered very quickly (often 
 
 58. Id. § 6.2.22. 
 59. E-mail from M. Ali, Consumer Contact Centre, Financial Services Authority, to Brian 
Rosenzweig, (Oct. 10, 2007, 12:16 EST) (on file with author). 
 60. CODE, supra note 16, § A(6). 
 61. Id. 
 62. RABINOWITZ, supra note 7, § 4-1020. 
 63. For example, in the year ended March 31, 2006, the Panel reviewed 151 takeover 
proposals, an increase from 114 the previous year.  THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, 
REPORT ON THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 2006, at 9 (2006), 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/new/reports/DATA//Report2006.pdf. 
 64. CODE, supra note 16, § A(6)(a). 
 65. Id. 
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within twenty-four hours), and do not require formal proceedings.66  
The ability of parties to seek informal, confidential advice from the 
Panel Executive is a unique aspect of the Code. 
Parties subject to the Code may also seek more formal 
interpretations from the Executive.67  In order to obtain a decision 
upon which a party may legally rely, a party must give all relevant 
details of the proposed transaction, including all parties’ names.68  
Mindful of the sensitivity of these details, the Panel strictly guards the 
information revealed.69  The Code also provides that obtaining 
professional advice on the interpretation of the Code in lieu of an 
official ruling is not appropriate.70  This instruction further encourages 
parties to consult the Panel directly and effectively limits the use of 
legal opinions rendered by professional service firms. 
Decisions of the Executive may be appealed.  The first appellate 
level is the Hearings Committee.71  A matter may reach the Hearings 
Committee in one of four ways.  First, a party subject to a ruling by 
the Executive may appeal that ruling to the Hearings Committee.72  
Second, the Executive may request a ruling from the Hearings 
Committee without rendering a decision itself.73  Third, the Executive 
may refer a case to the Hearings Committee where it believes a party 
has breached the Code or a prior ruling regarding the Code.74  Finally, 
the Code provides the Executive the discretion to seek Hearings 
Committee review where it deems it appropriate.75 
Hearings Committee proceedings are informal and are typically 
held in private maintaining the confidentiality of sensitive 
information.76  Though parties may bring solicitors and financial 
advisors with them to hearings, they almost always represent 
themselves to the Committee. 77  Also, formal rules of evidence are 
 
 66. See RABINOWITZ, supra note 7, § 4-1020. 
 67. CODE, supra note 16, § A(6)(b). 
 68. See Id. 
 69. RABINOWITZ, supra note 7, § 4-1023 n.4. 
 70. CODE, supra note 16, § A(6)(b). 
 71. See id. § A(7)(a). 
 72. Id. § A(7)(a)(i). 
 73. Id. § A(7)(a)(ii). 
 74. Id. § A(7)(a)(iii). 
 75. Id. § A(7)(a)(iv). 
 76. Id. § A(7)(c). 
 77. RABINOWITZ, supra note 7, § 4-1023. According to Rabinowitz, “[i]n cases of special 
difficulty the Panel has, very exceptionally, allowed a barrister to put the case of one of the 
parties.”  Id. § 4-1023 n.2. 
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not employed during hearings.78  Decisions of the Hearings 
Committee are typically published in a Panel Statement, a document 
released after the decision has been communicated to the parties 
involved.79  The final forum of review for the interpretation of the 
Code is Takeover Appeal Board.80  The Takeover Appeal Board 
publishes its decisions, also redacting confidential or commercially 
sensitive information.81 
In certain circumstances, the Takeover Panel may be subject to 
judicial review by courts of law.82  In Ex Parte Datafin,83 the Court of 
Appeal established that the Panel is subject to judicial review because 
“it perform[s] or operate[s] as an integral part of a system which 
perform[s] public law duties.”84  “Judicial review” is a carefully 
selected term in this context, since, as Rabinowitz explains, “courts of 
law will [not] operate as a court of appeal from Panel decisions; 
rather they will operate as a court of review.”85  The courts will not 
review the Panel’s findings of fact or evaluation of evidence.86  The 
role of the court in such a case is limited to determining whether the 
Panel has committed “[an] illegality . . . [acted with] irrationality . . . 
or [committed] a procedural impropriety.”87  Judicial review might be 
possible when a party challenges the good faith basis of the Panel’s 
exercise of its disciplinary powers88 or where the Panel grants 
individual exceptions from the operation of the Code.89  The Court of 
Appeal has expressed great deference towards the Panel’s decisions, 
especially with regard to the interpretation of its own rules.90  The 
 
 78. See id.  The procedures described in reference to the Hearing Committee are also 
employed by the Takeover Appeal Board.  Id at § 4-1026 n.5. 
 79. CODE, supra note 16, § A(7)(c). 
 80. See id. § A(8). 
 81. Id. § A(7)(b). 
 82. RABINOWITZ, supra note 7, § 4-1012. 
 83. [1987] Q.B. 815 (U.K.). 
 84. RABINOWITZ, supra note 7, § 4-1012 n.1. 
 85. Id. § 4-1012. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. (quoting ex parte Datafin, [1987] Q.B. at 842). 
 88. See id. § 4-1015 (referring to “bona fides”). 
 89. See id. (suggesting that judicial review might be appropriate where the Panel “grant[s] 
dispensation[s] from the operation of the Code.”). 
 90. See id. § 4-1014 (quoting Sir John Donaldson, Master of Rolls of the Court of Appeal, 
that “[w]hen it comes to interpreting its own rules, it must clearly be given considerable latitude 
both because, as legislator, it could properly alter them at any time . . . . Where there might be a 
legitimate cause for complaint and for the intervention of the court would be if the 
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general principle of Datafin, according to Rabinowitz, is that courts 
will not disturb Panel decisions, even where the Panel has 
overstepped its authority or acted unreasonably, if doing so is not in 
the public interest.91 
C. Substantive Rules of the Code 
Section B of the Code, entitled “General Principles,” sets out the 
foundational concepts of the substantive rules contained within the 
Code.92  Parties subject to the Code are required to honor the General 
Principles as well as the more detailed rules elaborated in the Code.93  
The Code further instructs that the rules, while expressed in more 
specific language than the General Principles, are still not technical in 
nature and “are to be interpreted to achieve their underlying 
purpose.”94  In this way, the Takeover Panel requires that parties 
follow not only the letter of the Code, but also its spirit.  The FSA 
explains that “principles-based regulation means, where possible, 
moving away from dictating through detailed, prescriptive and 
supervisory actions.”95  The FSA argues further that the principles-
based approach “foster[s] a more innovative and competitive 
financial services industry;”96 and that “[i]n a quickly changing 
marketplace, principles are far more durable [than legal rules].”97 
When taken in the context of the strengthening of the Panel’s 
statutory backing through the expansion of FSA authority described 
above, the goal of principles-based regulation suggests that the FSA is 
striving to maintain Britain’s self-regulatory heritage.  In addition to 
the preference for principles over rules, the Code includes several 
provisions, two of which are discussed here, that differ significantly 
from corresponding American provisions. 
First, the Code requires target corporations to obtain 
shareholder approval before taking actions that might frustrate a 
 
interpretation were so far removed from the natural and ordinary meaning of the words of the 
rules that an ordinary user of the market could reasonably be misled.”). 
 91. See id. § 4-1016 (suggesting that the “general tenor” of Datafin is that “the court will 
only set aside a Panel decision if [doing so] is in the public interest,” and that accordingly, 
“decisions will not be disturbed if to do so would be in the public interest.”). 
 92. CODE, supra note 16, § B 
 93. See id. § A(2)(b). 
 94. Id. 
 95. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON THE OUTCOMES 
THAT MATTER 4 (2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf. 
 96. Id. at 2. 
 97. Id. at 6. 
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potential offer or prevent a shareholder vote on the merits of a bid.98  
In restricting defensive actions, the Code endorses the theory that 
hostile tender offers are beneficial transactions that offer 
shareholders an opportunity to remove entrenched management and 
receive fair value for their shares. 
Second, the Code incorporates a mandatory offer rule.  When a 
bidder seeks to acquire more than thirty percent of the outstanding 
shares of a target corporation, the Code requires not only that the 
bidder be able to finance the acquisition of all remaining shares, but 
also that the bidder make an offer to all shareholders at the highest 
price paid for any share in the thirty percent block.99  This rule serves 
to protect shareholders of the target from “predatory” transactions 
that involve a tender offer for a substantial majority of shares, 
followed by a freeze-out merger of the remaining shares. 
D. Conclusion 
The defining characteristic of the British system is self-regulation 
based on general principles.  The FSA has taken an increasingly 
influential role in the enforcement of the Code, but the development, 
interpretation and initial enforcement of the Code are all still 
squarely within the control of the Panel.  The Code is the work of all 
of the stakeholders in the financial community, from service 
institutions like brokerage houses and investment banks, to 
institutional investors such as pension funds and insurers.  What 
distinguishes the British system100 is the proximity between the 
regulators and the regulated parties.  Such a system undoubtedly 
lends credibility to the regulations and builds trust within the system. 
II.  TAKEOVER REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Takeover regulation in the United States is an amalgam of 
federal and state law.  The U.S. Constitution limits the powers of the 
federal government, reserving the remaining authority to the states.101  
Federal government involvement in the control of hostile takeovers 
has taken the form of securities laws, most notably the Williams 
 
 98. CODE, supra note 16, § I(21)(1)(a). 
 99. Id. § F(9). 
 100. This is not to say that British system is unique, as it has served as a model for several 
other takeover control regimes, such as Ireland and Australia.  See NICOLE E. CALLEJA, THE 
NEW TAKEOVERS PANEL- A BETTER WAY? 35-40 (2002). 
 101. FORSTINGER, supra note 8, at 16-17. 
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Act.102  Limited federal jurisdiction leaves issues of general corporate 
activity and policy to the states.103  Under the doctrine of internal 
affairs, the law of the state where a firm is incorporated governs the 
activities of the firm, the actions of its officers and directors and the 
relationship between the firm and its shareholders.104 
A. Federal Regulation:  The Williams Act 
In response to the increasingly common use of the tender offer as 
a means of accomplishing corporate takeovers in the 1960s,105 
Congress passed the Williams Act amendments to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).106  Prior to the passage of the 
Williams Act, unregulated tender offers were a popular alternative to 
statutory mergers.107  Under the existing securities laws, bidders were 
required to make little disclosure to the shareholders of target 
corporations in the context of tender offers.108  The Williams Act and 
the subsequent regulations promulgated under it set out general rules 
and procedures for tender offers,109 including requirements for 
disclosure110 and filing.111  These federal provisions control the tender 
offer process by placing substantive obligations upon bidders.  While 
the focus of federal takeover regulation is on the bidder’s actions, 
some commentators have explained that intention of Congress was to 
create a system that was neutral as between the interests of hostile 
bidders and incumbent managers.112  Nevertheless, it is important to 
 
 102. Id. at 74-75. 
 103. Id. at 17. 
 104. Id. 
 105. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 478 (4th ed. 2002). 
 106. Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-
(f)). 
 107. HAZEN, supra note 105, at 478-79. 
 108. Id. at 479. 
 109. Rule 14d-7 provides for free withdrawal of tendered securities prior to the expiration of 
the offer.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (2007).  Rule 14d-8 provides for pro rata acceptance of shares in 
an oversubscribed tender offer.  Rule 14d-10 provides for a best price rule.  See HAZEN, supra 
note 105, at 496-501. 
 110. Section 13(d) of the Williams Act provides that any person who acquires beneficial 
ownership of more than five percent of the outstanding shares of any class of registered equity 
securities must file a disclosure statement, alerting investors to the buyer’s identity and 
intentions.  See HAZEN, supra note 105, at 484-85. 
 111. Section 14(d) of the Williams Act provides for the filing of materials fully and fairly 
describing the offer.  See Id. at 493. 
 112. See FORSTINGER, supra note 8, at 75. 
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recognize how the mode of federal takeover regulation is limited in 
scope. 
1. Refining Federal Takeover Rules.  The Williams Act itself 
provides for certain substantive requirements and practices,113 but in 
other areas the statute is ambiguous.114  Congress, in fact, drafted the 
federal securities laws broadly, leaving room for the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to clarify issues.115  As Professor Hazen 
explains, “[t]he SEC has broad rule-making powers under the various 
statutes it administers and has exercised its authority by prescribing at 
least three different kinds of rules.”116  First, the SEC promulgates 
rules defining the procedures to be followed in Commission 
proceedings.117  Second, the SEC promulgates rules that fill in the 
terms of statutes over which it has authority to regulate.118  For 
example, § 14(d)(6) of the 1934 Act (added by the Williams Act) 
provides for pro rata acceptance of tendered shares even if the offer 
does not so require.119  “Rule 14d-8, extends the pro rata requirements 
to the entire period of the tender offer,”120 thereby preventing an 
offeror from extending an offer period in order to affect pro rata 
distribution.121  Third, some SEC rules define general terms used in 
the statutes.122  Interestingly, though the term “tender offer” is not 
explicitly defined in the Williams Act,123 the SEC has continually 
refused to promulgate a rule clarifying the definition.124  Outside of 
formal rules, the SEC can also create law through more informal 
means, most commonly though SEC releases.125  While releases are 
 
 113. For example, § 13(d) of the Williams Act provides for disclosure.  See HAZEN, supra 
note 105, at 484-85. 
 114. See id. at 3 (explaining that “[t]he statutes are, however, quite sketchy or ambiguous in 
many important areas”). 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 496. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 3. 
 123. Id. at 486. 
 124. See id. at 487-88 n.15 (explaining that what is used instead of a formal definition is an 
“eight factor test which is not contained in an official SEC release [but] has evolved over a 
period of time and is discussed in [several federal court cases]”). 
 125. Id. at 3. 
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meant to be interpretive, they do have precedent value.126  The SEC 
occupies an important role in clarifying and refining federal takeover 
rules. 
2. Enforcing the Williams Act Provisions.  The 1934 Act grants 
the SEC authority to investigate all potential violations of Williams 
Act.127  The SEC also has subpoena power,128 greatly enhancing its 
ability to investigate misconduct and build cases against violators.  
Accordingly, the SEC has the ability to file lawsuits in federal district 
courts to compel compliance with Williams Act provisions.129 
The SEC always has standing to bring lawsuits under the 
Williams Act, but in certain circumstances, private parties may also 
pursue litigation to enforce Williams Act provisions.130  While the 
Williams Act does not explicitly provide for any private right of 
action,131 federal courts have interpreted certain provisions of the 
Williams Act to grant private rights of action.132  For example, in 
Polaroid v. Disney, the Third Circuit held that a target corporation 
has standing to sue for an injunction to stop a tender offer under § 
14(e) of the Williams Act for misrepresentation. 133  Though the Court 
also found that, in this case, the target corporation lacked a cause of 
action to sue for a violation of the All Holders Rule amendment to 
the Act,134 it explained that a private right of action does exist for 
shareholders under that rule.135  Private rights of action grant 
individual shareholders, and in some cases, target corporations, a 
powerful tool with which to resist (or merely delay) tender offers.  
Further, it is important to recognize that private rights of action may 
not be a realistic option for some potential plaintiffs due to the high 
cost of filing and pursuing lawsuits in federal court. 
 
 126. Id. at 31. 
 127. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (2006). 
 128. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b).  See also HAZEN, supra note 105, at 878 (explaining that “the 
issuance of an order authorizing a formal investigation gives the SEC staff subpoena power.”). 
 129. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d). 
 130. HAZEN, supra note 105, at 518-19. 
 131. CHARLES R.T. O’KELLY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 1012 (5th ed. 2006). 
 132. Edward F. Greene, Andrew Curran & David A. Christman, Toward a Cohesive 
Approach to Cross-Border Takeover Regulation, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 823, 835 n.60 (1997). 
 133. 862 F.2d 987, 1003 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 134. Id. at 1001-02.  The court explained that “[t]he All Holders Rule states that a bidder’s 
tender offer must be open to ‘all security holders of the class of securities subject to the tender 
offer.’”  Id. at 991-92 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)). 
 135. Id. at 993. 
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3. Interpreting Federal Takeover Rules.  Interpretation and 
development of federal takeover regulation is a combination of SEC 
clarification and common law jurisprudence.  Along with formal rule-
making and issuing informal policy statements, the SEC also 
interprets the law through the “no action” letter process.136  No action 
letters are private requests for ex ante indications of the legality of a 
proposed action under the federal securities laws.137  No action letters 
reflect the personal interpretation of SEC staff members, and they do 
not bind the SEC to any particular position in a subsequent formal 
proceeding and the existence of a no action letter in favor of an action 
does not preclude a party from challenging such an action in a 
privately initiated suit.138 
Further, the federal courts routinely hear cases brought under 
Williams Act provisions, either by the SEC or by private parties.  
These rulings create federal common law precedent within their 
respective federal jurisdictions and provide persuasive authority in 
other federal districts and circuits. 
B. State Law Concerning Takeovers 
State regulation of corporate takeover activity takes two distinct 
forms: state corporation laws, which govern the activities of corporate 
entities chartered within that state139 and state anti-takeover statutes, 
which operate in a fashion similar to the Williams Act.140  The 
practical effect of this overlapping system is that actions of target 
boards are constrained by state corporation law, while the actions of 
bidders are constrained by federal law.141 
1. State Corporation Law.  States control takeovers through 
constraints on the activities of target corporations.  As the seat of 
many of America’s largest corporations, Delaware is by far the most 
influential state with regard to corporate law.142  Disputes involving 
corporate takeovers most often find their way to Delaware’s 
Chancery Court in the form of a suit for injunction.143  In this type of 
 
 136. HAZEN, supra note 105, at 31. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 31-32. 
 139. FORSTINGER, supra note 8, at 17. 
 140. Id. at 87. 
 141. See Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1743. 
 142. See FORSTINGER, supra note 8, at 17; see also Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1755. 
 143. Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1743. 
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suit, bidders contest the defensive actions of the incumbent board of 
directors, often alleging violations of fiduciary duty.144  Accordingly, 
dissatisfied parties may look to state law to contest either the actions 
of a bidder or the defensive measures taken by a target in the context 
of a tender offer.  Through a series of prominent cases, the Delaware 
courts have elaborated several concepts through which takeover 
defenses are analyzed.  When compared to the British system under 
the Code, Delaware law provides target boards with far more latitude 
in crafting defenses to hostile bids.145 
In Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum,146 the Delaware Chancery Court 
upheld the self-tender offer of a target corporation that was designed 
to defeat a hostile bid.147  Under Unocal, defensive measures are 
permitted where directors act “in good faith and upon a reasonable 
investigation”148 and the measures taken are “reasonable in response 
to the threat posed.”149  In permitting Unocal’s self-tender, the Court 
permitted a tender offer that was specifically designed to exclude a 
particular party, the hostile offeror.  This kind of disparate treatment, 
however, was effectively outlawed by a subsequent amendment to the 
Williams Act, the All Holders Rule.150  It is important to realize that 
Unocal’s shareholders were not given the opportunity to decide the 
merits of the hostile bid. 
Shareholder rights plans, often known as “poison pills,” are a 
common defensive measure utilized by corporations to fend off 
hostile tender offers.  Under Delaware law, corporations may endow 
shares with special rights or privileges.151  These rights plans may be 
created by the board of directors without the need for a vote by the 
shareholders.152  A poison pill plan allows shareholders to purchase 
additional securities upon the occurrence of a certain event, often the 
purchase of a substantial number of shares by a hostile bidder. 153  
Poison pill plans come in several varieties, but the common effect of 
such plans is that the holdings of a hostile bidder are diluted, 
 
 144. FORSTINGER, supra note 8, at 17. 
 145. See Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1756. 
 146. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 147. See id. at 958. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 955. 
 150. COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 683. 
 151. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (2001). 
 152. COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 658. 
 153. Id. at 655. 
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increasing the cost of a takeover transaction.154  The legality of 
shareholder rights plans and other defensive measures taken by 
incumbent management have been litigated heavily in the Delaware 
courts.  In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,155 the Delaware 
Supreme Court upheld a poison pill rights plan as a permissible 
defensive measure under the Unocal doctrine.156  Revlon Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.157 further refined the Unocal 
doctrine by holding that the reasonableness of defensive measures is 
to be assessed in terms of obtaining the most valuable consideration 
for target shareholders, not guarding the risk of a change in control.158 
Some commentators argue that the Delaware cases exemplify an 
“absolute expansion in the freedom of directors to adopt defensive 
measures in response to hostile takeovers.”159  However, Professor 
Ventoruzzo suggests that the Delaware cases “reflect a difficulty in 
developing clear rules to govern at such a delicate intersection 
between protecting against management’s self-interest and allowing 
strategic management decision-making.”160  This theory questions the 
utility of fiduciary duty to achieve the goals of corporate takeover 
regulation.  Litigation of fiduciary duty claims is inherently fact-
dependent, an ex post assessment that does not generate clear or 
simple rules to instruct future actions.  While it is clear that target 
boards in the United States have an enhanced ability to utilize 
takeover defenses, this does not indicate that the American system 
disfavors takeover in general. 
2. State Anti-Takeover Statutes.  Since the passage of the 
Williams Act in 1968, many states have adopted anti-takeover laws 
specifically regulating tender offers.161  Some of these provisions go 
beyond protecting investors from manipulation by bidders and are 
aimed at deterring takeover activity to protect incumbent 
management and the local business community.162  Such provisions 
 
 154. Id. at 655-56. 
 155. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
 156. COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 656. 
 157. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 158. COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 664. 
 159. See Marco Venturouzzo, Europe’s Thirteenth Directive and U.S. Takeover Regulation: 
Regulatory means and Political and Economic Ends, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 171, 188 (2006). 
 160. Id. 
 161. See HAZEN, supra note 105, at 538. 
 162. Id. 
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are known colloquially as “shark repellents.”163  State anti-takeover 
statutes have evolved over time in response to federal legislation and 
federal-court litigation regarding the constitutionality of such state 
laws. 
The “first generation” of state takeover laws granted state 
regulators great authority to analyze the substantive merits of 
takeover bids.164  State regulators could initiate hearings or hold 
hearings at the request of interested parties.165  Such hearings and 
statutory waiting periods served to slow the tender offer process.  In 
Edgar v. MITE Corp.,166 the Supreme Court held that the Illinois anti-
takeover statute violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution because “the State has no legitimate interest in 
protecting nonresident shareholders.”167 
In response to the Edgar case, some states modified or adopted 
new anti-takeover provisions.168 A theme among the second 
generation of statutes is reliance on the state’s authority to monitor 
corporate governance, as opposed to the state’s authority to regulate 
the trading of securities.169  Indiana, for example, passed a “control 
share acquisition” statute, which provides for restricted voting by 
shareholders whose ownership exceeds twenty percent of the 
outstanding shares.170  The statute further provides for a mandatory 
meeting of shareholders to vote on the offer within fifty days,171 a term 
longer than the Williams Act requires.172  The bidders challenged the 
Indiana statute in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America173 to no 
avail, as the Supreme Court upheld the statute on the grounds that 
the delay was not unreasonable and that the bidder was not 
disadvantaged.174  Professors Cox and Hazen comment that the Court 
was loathe to invalidate the statute for fear of undermining the long-
 
 163. Id. 
 164. COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 691. 
 165. Id. 
 166. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
 167. Id. at 644. 
 168. FORSTINGER, supra note 8, at 76. 
 169. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 692. 
 170. See id. at 692-93. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Rule 14e-1 requires that a tender offer must held open for at least twenty business days.  
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (2007). 
 173. 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
 174. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 693. 
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standing internal affairs doctrine.175  As a regulation of the activities of 
corporations and not as a control on transactions in shares, the 
Indiana statute was able to pass constitutional muster. 
In the wake of the CTS Corp. decision, several states have passed 
further anti-takeover provisions.  Third generation statutes are 
geared towards preventing freeze-outs of minority shareholders after 
a tender offer is made to gain control.  New York’s “freeze” statute 
prohibits a cash-out merger within five years of a change of control 
tender offer if the tender offer was not approved by incumbent 
management.176  Delaware’s statute requires a three year waiting 
period.177  Since these freeze statutes are based on the states’ authority 
to regulate the internal affairs of state charted corporations, they are 
protected from constitutional Commerce Clause scrutiny under CTS 
Corp. 
C. Conclusion 
The American system of takeover regulation is a combination of 
federal statutes and regulations, state anti-takeover statutes and state 
fiduciary duty concepts.  At times the doctrines intersect, as with state 
anti-takeover statutes and the federal Williams Act.  In other 
instances, the interpretation of one body of law will drive the 
development of another, as when the Unocal case prompted the 
adoption of the “All Holders” provision of the Williams Act. 
Even though American takeover law has many sources, several 
themes underlie the system in general.  First, there is a clear desire for 
minimum standards of fairness in the tender offer process.  Since the 
protection of investors has always been a principal goal of federal 
securities regulation, it is unsurprising that fairness and equity for all 
shareholders is a primary concern.  However, the focus on minimum 
standards has necessitated regulation through strict rules, which can 
enable creative directors to evade the spirit of the regulation.  In 
order to check director creativity, regulators need to monitor current 
practices and adjust regulations to keep up with innovation.  This puts 
pressure on regulators, such as the SEC, as well as state judiciaries 
and legislatures, to make sure that their respective systems are well 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. N.Y Bus. Corp. Law § 912 (McKinney Supp. 2002).  See also COX & HAZEN, supra note 
3, at 694. 
 177. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2001).  See also COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 694. 
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situated to serve those constituencies who rely on them for 
protection. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The British and American models differ significantly in the 
means through which takeover regulations are promulgated, 
interpreted and enforced.  British takeover rules are promulgated by 
a single entity acting with jurisdiction to control nearly all aspects of 
the tender offer process.  Regulated entities are required to follow the 
letter as well as the spirit of the Code.  The self-regulatory structure 
of the Panel reduces the incidence of litigation between adverse 
parties, while the proximity between the regulators and the industry 
players means that the Panel has enhanced credibility.  In the United 
States, decentralized regulation based on legal rules leaves room for 
market actors to seek innovative solutions to takeover problems.  In 
order to keep up with market innovation, regulators, courts and 
legislatures need to continue to refine takeover provisions so as to 
ensure protection of shareholders while providing an efficient market 
for corporate control.  Also, the availability of defensive actions in 
the United States can make hostile transactions more complicated 
and costly. 
Professors Armour and Skeel explain that the prohibition of 
defensive measures in the British market increases the frequency and 
the rate of success of hostile bids.178  In analyzing the effects of the 
differing modes of regulation, they argue that the American system is 
less shareholder-friendly.179  They argue that the shareholder-friendly 
regime developed in Britain because institutional investors were 
better organized and more powerful in Britain at the time that 
takeover regulation was taking hold.180  By contrast, institutional 
investors were far less prominent in the United States, due to high 
rates of share ownership by individuals181 and laws restricting the 
ability of certain entities, such as banks, from becoming significant 
 
 178. See Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1738 (indicating that 0.85% of takeover bids in 
the United Kingdom are hostile, compared to 0.57% in the United States, and that 43% of such 
bids are completed in the United Kingdom, as opposed to 24% in the United States). 
 179. Id.  Armour and Skeel further explain that high personal dividend income taxes in 
Britain, combined with tax relief for collective investment schemes, such as pension funds, 
fueled institutional share ownership.  Id. at 1768-69. 
 180. Id. at 1793. 
 181. See id. at 1768 (indicating that in 1970, shortly after the passage of the Williams Act, 
nearly eighty percent of shares were own by individual investors). 
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shareholders.182  Now that institutional share ownership has increased 
significantly in the United States and may even outpace institutional 
share ownership in Britain,183 the question is no longer why the 
shareholder-friendly regime developed in Britain, but whether the 
American system actually disadvantages American investors. 
The American approach to takeover regulation appears to be 
more costly than the British system.  First, in the United States, the 
duration of takeover bids is not limited by law, while British takeover 
bids must be completed in a limited timeframe. 184  Second, American 
takeover disputes are often litigated in court, resulting significant 
legal fees, whereas in Britain the Panel is quick to respond to 
takeover disputes and legal fees are minimized due to the general 
absence of lawyers at Panel proceedings.185  One possibility is that the 
efficiency and reduced costs of the British system, coupled with freer 
shareholder choice, result in a more favorable system for 
shareholders.  However, it is also possible that the availability of 
takeover defenses and the more deliberate, rule-based adjudication of 
disputes can actually prove beneficial to shareholders. 
The increased costs of launching a hostile takeover in the United 
States, generated principally by defensive tactics and the possibility of 
takeover litigation, should encourage more negotiated transactions.186  
An increased number of friendly transactions may actually be 
beneficial to shareholders.  In principle, corporate boards are in an 
ideal position to value merger consideration because they know their 
businesses and have access to the most current and relevant 
information.  Permitting target boards to shape the tender offer 
process can allow competent boards to veto poor offers and increase 
the likelihood of more favorable offers.  In short, the preference for 
director involvement in shareholder decision making may represent a 
positive value judgment, despite the overwhelming appeal of 
shareholder choice.  This theory does have overtones of paternalism, 
which is logical given Armour and Skeel’s explanation of the origins 
 
 182. Id. at 1752. 
 183. See id. at 1768-69. 
 184. Id. at 1746-47. 
 185. Id.  See also supra Part I.B.3. 
 186. Certain features of the British system also increase costs compared to the American 
system.  One notable example is the mandatory offer rule, requiring bidders to line up financing 
for a full takeover where more than thirty percent of the outstanding shares are sought.  See 
supra Part I.C. 
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of the American policy.  However, this paternalism is not necessarily 
outdated, despite the change in share ownership patterns. 
While hostile takeovers are less frequent in the United States, 
they are still a very real threat to delinquent corporate boards.187  
Additionally, the rise of institutional share ownership in the United 
States has not resulted in any significant changes in takeover 
regulation.  In fact, some institutional shareholders have embraced 
their independent, detached role in corporate governance.  For 
example, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(CALPERS) Focus List Program, which identifies underperforming 
corporations, has had a positive effect in improving the performance 
and governance of highlighted companies.188  The increased numbers 
of highly sophisticated shareholders does not diminish the capacity of 
responsible corporate boards to determine the value of takeover 
offers.  It is the role of the board of directors to help shareholders 
decide and understand the merits of takeover proposals, thus 
increasing the number of negotiated offers should serve to better 
educated shareholders about their options.  Finally, a recent study 
concluded that the shareholders of American corporations receive 
greater premiums for shares of corporations involved in merger and 
acquisition transactions.189  The study indicates that the average share 
price premium paid in American merger and acquisition transactions 
(both friendly and hostile) exceeded the average premium paid in 
British M&A transactions by approximately six percent.190  These data 
indicate that the U.S. market demands a higher premium, perhaps in 
part because the American takeover regime promotes higher-priced, 
negotiated deals. 
The notion that American takeover regulation favors incumbent 
management at the expense of shareholders must be considered 
against the general backdrop of comparative corporate governance.  
As explained earlier, the threat of a hostile takeover has the effect of 
keeping incumbent managers honest, but it is by no means the only 
tool available to shareholders.  Derivative litigation, which is a more 
 
 187. See supra note 186. 
 188. See Julie Earle, Laggards that are brought into line, FINANCIAL TIMES (U.K.), April 14, 
2003, at 1, available at http://search.ft.com/nonFtArticle?id=030414003023. 
 189. Gregory Jackson & Hideaki Miyajima, Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties of Markets: 
Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan, Germany, France, the UK and USA 50 (Research Inst. of 
Econ., Trade & Indus., Discussion Paper Series 07-E-054, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012210. 
 190. Id.  These data reflect premiums paid during the period of 2000-2005.  Id. 
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robust remedy in the United States than in the United Kingdom, also 
provides a mechanism through which shareholders can exert pressure 
on incumbent managers. 191  Contingent attorney fees for plaintiffs 
increase the ability of shareholders to pursue derivative suits in 
America,192 whereas the “loser pays” system and the absence of 
contingent fee arrangements make derivative litigation more difficult 
in England.193  And while Miller argues that derivative litigation and 
hostile takeovers are not perfect substitutes for one another because 
they address different forms of mismanagement,194 the specter of 
derivative suits must provide additional protection to American 
shareholders.  If takeover law is viewed as a piece of the larger 
corporate governance system, it is possible that the American system 
may provide comparable protection to shareholders, despite the 
appearance of reduced shareholder choice in hostile takeover 
transactions. 
CONCLUSION 
The rising influence of the FSA may suggest a certain degree of 
convergence between the British and American models of takeover 
regulation.  While the Panel continues to operate independently, the 
addition of a firmer statutory foundation to the British system 
enhances the reliability of enforcement.  The ability of the FSA to 
target Code violators for market abuse provides an extra layer of 
protection for the British financial markets.  In the past, the 
augmented role of the FSA and its insistence that it will not disturb 
the Panel’s activities were met with some skepticism.  Shortly after 
the endorsement procedure was implemented, uncertainty was 
reported among the London bar about whether the arrangement 
would result in the FSA taking a more active role in takeover 
regulation.195  According to the Panel itself, cooperation between the 
 
 191. See Miller, supra note 5, at 61-68. 
 192. See id. at 75-76. 
 193. See id.  Miller explains that the legal doctrines also differ significantly.  American 
courts have clearly recognized the right of shareholders to bring derivative suits, whereas British 
courts have permitted such suits only as an exception to the general rule that a company, and 
not its shareholders, may pursue actions for damages caused to the company.  See id. at 60-65. 
 194. Id. at 78. 
 195. See Lawyers question hands-off role for FSA on takeovers, 21 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 3, 3 
(2002) (quoting Chris Bright of Shearman & Sterling that “[o]ne can expect tension and it seems 
likely that the oversight of the FSA will be increasingly required.  In the abstract, the FSA can 
be hands off, but when hard cases come along . . . you will have to ask if the authority can 
maintain this stance”). 
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FSA and the Panel under the endorsement mechanism was 
successful196 and the Panel remains hopeful that the relations with the 
FSA will continue to be positive under the new regime.197  However, 
the possibility still remains that the new statutory system will enable 
increased litigation or result in the FSA’s involvment in actual 
regulation of takeovers. 
Just as the British are incorporating principles of statutory 
backing, the American system stands to benefit from an exchange of 
ideas and best practices.  The theory of principles-based regulation 
that is promoted by the FSA serves an equally beneficial purpose in 
the context of American regulation.  Promoting fairness and positive 
outcomes through principles-based regulation would be a positive 
step for American regulators.  Principles are not adverse to statutory 
regulation; it is possible to encourage market participants to meet 
general standards of fairness without discouraging innovation or 
market efficiency.  The Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben 
Bernanke, recently suggested that the United States would benefit 
from incorporating British principles-based concepts.198  Furthermore, 
encouraging market players and regulators to work together could 
prove important for the continued vitality of American markets.  It is 
essential for all involved to recognize that regulation is not a zero sum 
game; enforcing sensible rules creates benefits for all participants and 
provides reliability and security to a domain that, if left alone, would 
likely be chaotic and unfair. 
 
 196. THE TAKEOVER PANEL, REPORT ON THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 2002, at 9 (2002), 
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 197. THE TAKEOVER PANEL, REPORT ON THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 2007, at 9 (2007), 
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 198. See Jeremy Grant, Bernanke calls for UK-style regulation, FINANCIAL TIMES (U.K.), 
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